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Husserl, Dummett, and the Linguistic Turn 
Walter Hopp 
 
Abstract: 
Michael Dummett famously holds that the “philosophy of thought” must proceed 
via the philosophy of language, since that is the only way to preserve the 
objectivity of thoughts while avoiding commitments to “mythological,” Platonic 
entities.  Central to Dummett’s case is his thesis that all thought contents are 
linguistically expressible.  In this paper, I will (a) argue that making the linguistic 
turn is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid the problems of psychologism, (b) 
discuss Wayne Martin’s argument that not all thought-contents are linguistically 
communicable, and (c) present another, stronger argument, derived from 
Husserl’s early account of fulfillment, that establishes the same conclusion. 
 
Michael Dummett’s criticism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological approach to the 
“philosophy of thought” has been widely discussed and criticized. (Martin, 1999; Parsons, 2000; 
Smith, 1989)  In the present essay, I will attempt to provide additional reasons for preferring 
Husserl’s phenomenological approach to thought over Dummett’s linguistic approach, reasons 
that, in my opinion, are more compelling than those yet presented in the literature.    
According to Dummett, “What distinguishes analytical philosophy… from other schools 
is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical 
account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained.” 
(Dummett, 1994, p. 4)  As a characterization of analytic philosophy, this is far from satisfactory, 
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but it is clear that many philosophers, including many of the leading lights within the analytic 
tradition, have endorsed something like this thesis.  It is equally clear, I think, that Husserl did 
not, and that this claim is antithetical to the phenomenological approach to consciousness, 
thought, and knowledge.  This is not just because, on a Husserlian view, the intentionality of 
mental acts is explanatorily and ontologically prior to the intentionality of linguistic signs.  Nor 
is it simply because Husserl, unlike Dummett and Wittgenstein, held that there are acts of 
thinking, understanding, and cognizing—a thesis whose denial I have, frankly, never quite been 
able even to make sense of, and so will not criticize here.  It is, rather, principally because if 
Dummett’s claim is correct, a further Dummettian thesis, which Husserl undeniably rejects, must 
be true, namely that “It is of the essence of thought, not merely to be communicable, but to be 
communicable, without residue, by means of language.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 261)  I am not 
altogether confident that this, if true, is sufficient to support the claim that a theory of thought 
must proceed via a theory of language.  But I think it’s fairly obviously necessary.  If there are 
some thoughts or thought contents that are not communicable by means of language, and if a 
philosophical account of language must confine itself to the examination of contents which are 
thus communicable, then an account of language cannot succeed as a comprehensive account of 
thinking or thought. 
In this paper, I will examine two arguments against the Communicability Thesis, one due 
to Wayne Martin, and one easily extracted from Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical 
Investigations.  I choose to focus on this account for several reasons.  The first, which I cannot 
defend here, is that I think it is more philosophically satisfactory than his later, noema-centered 
account, an account whose central notion continues to perplex Husserl’s commentators, and with 
good reason.  Insofar as my principal purpose here is to establish a philosophical claim, rather 
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than trace the rich and tangled historical development of Husserl’s thought, I have chosen to 
focus on that period in his development in which he offers the most promising account of 
thought and intentionality.  The second is that this account is not susceptible to one of 
Dummett’s main complaints against Husserl, namely that he mistakenly generalizes the notion of 
sense (Sinn) to all acts of consciousness.  Before doing so, however, I will consider a line of 
thinking that might make the linguistic turn seem mandatory, namely that thoughts and their 
contents must be objective if we psychologism is to be avoided.  I will argue that making the 
linguistic turn is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid psychologism, and that any naturalistic 
linguistic turn is susceptible to the most damning objections that Husserl lodged against 
psychologism. 
 
I. 
The Communicability Thesis can be stated in terms of the contents of thoughts as follows: 
(CT): For any content of thought C, C is communicable by means of language.   
Just what does that mean?  For starters, just what sorts of things are contents?  To the enormous 
detriment of anyone attempting to achieve clarity on fundamental questions in the philosophy of 
thought, the term ‘content’ is used, often by a single author, as a catch-all term for just anything 
that is related to the mind in whatever fashion.  Christopher Peacocke, for instance, says, 
Henceforth I use the phrase “the content of experience” to cover not only which 
objects, properties and relations are perceived, but also the ways in which they are 
perceived. 1  
                                                
1 Peacocke, 2001, p. 241.  For a telling indication of the unruliness of the term ‘content’ in contemporary 
philosophy, check out Chalmers, 2006. 
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So, when I perceive a tree, Peacocke would like me to apply the term ‘content’ to both the tree 
and the way in which the tree is perceived, despite the fact that these two things share very few 
of their salient properties, and despite the fact that the two are related in manifestly different 
ways to my act of perceiving the tree.  The tree has bark, and my experience is of or about it; the 
way in which the tree is perceived does not have bark, and my experience, though related to it 
somehow, is not about it.  
Throughout what follows, I will follow the Husserlian tradition and most contemporary 
authors by understanding contents to be bearers of intentionality or aboutness.  Such things as 
propositions, for instance, are contents, since they represent the world as being a certain way.  So 
are the constituents of propositions, namely concepts or Fregean senses.  Such things as trees and 
states of affairs, on the other hand, though obviously among the objects of thought and discourse, 
are not bearers of intentionality, and so are not and cannot function as contents in the sense in 
which I mean them.  And I will follow Husserl in holding that the content of a cognitive act or 
state is that feature in virtue of which that act is directed upon its object in the determinate 
manner that it is.  Insofar as that feature in virtue of which an act is directed upon its object is not 
something that we invariably think about, and in fact is something that, while performing an act, 
precisely do not think about, the content of an act is not, in most (all?) cases, that which the act is 
about.  My belief that my office is messy has as its content the proposition that my office is 
messy.  But my belief is not about a proposition, since my belief is about the very same thing 
that the proposition itself is about, and the proposition is not about itself or any other proposition.   
One broadly recognized feature of contents, thus construed, are that they bear an intimate 
relationship with individual psychological episodes.  Indeed, individual mental states have, or at 
least seem to have, many of the same properties that their contents have.  My belief, both in the 
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dispositional and occurrent sense of ‘belief’, that Socrates is wise itself has the same truth value 
as, and bears the same logical relations to other propositions as, the proposition itself.  Another 
widely recognized feature of contents is their objectivity; despite their psychological intimacy, 
contents are objective in the sense that they can serve as the contents of many numerically 
distinct psychological episodes.  When you and I agree that snow is white, what we believe is the 
very same thing.  Both Husserl and Frege regard such entities as objective in all of the following 
senses as well: (i) neither their existence, properties, nor the laws pertaining to them depend 
upon our or anyone else’s psychological constitution; (ii) they exist independently of serving as 
the content of any mental state; and (iii) they are ideal or “non-actual” entities, neither mental 
nor physical, occupying an “ideal sphere” or “third realm.” (See Frege, 1893, p. 204) As such, 
Husserl, again like Frege, rejects logical psychologism.  Although psychologism is a difficult 
position to pin down, I will understand psychologism to be the thesis that individual 
psychological episodes of thinking, judging, inferring, and so forth both (a) are the truth-makers 
for and (b) constitute the evidential basis of our knowledge of propositions concerning contents 
and the logical laws governing them.2  
To that extend, Husserl and Frege “extruded” thoughts from the mind, a move which, 
according to Dummett, enables us to carve the philosophy or thought off from the philosophy of 
mind.  Dummett also argues, however, that Frege’s and Husserl’s third-realm ontology is a piece 
of philosophical mythology.  Making the linguistic turn preserves the objectivity of contents 
while avoiding ontological mythology by locating meanings outside the mind but firmly in the 
spatio-temporal world.  (See Dummett, 1994, p. 25)   
                                                
2 “Logical Psychologism is the view that the non-normative statements made by logicians are about, and draw their 
evidence from the examination of, the particular conceivings, assertings, and inferrings of particular persons – a 
range of facts commonly thought to belong to the science of psychology alone.”  (Willard, 1977, p. 10) 
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This mythology served Frege and Husserl as a bulwark against… psychologism… If, now, our 
capacity for though is equated with, or at least explained in terms of, our ability to use language, 
no such bulwark is required: for language is a social phenomenon, in no way private to the 
individual, and its use is publicly observable. (Dummett, 1994, p. 131) 
Husserl fails to make such a turn, according to Dummett, because in the period between the 
publication of his Logical Investigations and Ideas I, he generalizes the notion of sense to all 
mental acts: “Something like sense… must inform every mental act; not merely those involving 
linguistic expression or capable of linguistic expression, but acts of sensory perception, for 
example.”3  As such, after putting forward a resolutely anti-psychologistic position in the Logical 
Investigations, in his later works Husserl is guilty of a sort of relapse into psychologism or, at the 
very least, “something rather hard to distinguish from psychologism.” (Dummett, 1981, p. 56)  
 Dummett is, I believe, mistaken on several counts.  In the first place, it is entirely 
consistent to hold that contents are objective in all of the ways in which Husserl and Frege held 
them to be, while also intimately related to individual acts of thinking, judging, and so forth.  It is 
incumbent upon any theory of thought to make the psychological intimacy of contents 
intelligible.  Frege, notoriously, does virtually nothing to explain the relation between contents 
and psychological acts, beyond saying that it is “the most mysterious of all.”4 (Frege, 1906, p. 
246)  He does at least give this relation a name: thinking is a matter of “grasping” thoughts.  This 
strongly suggests thoughts or propositions are, in all cases, among the objects of acts of thinking.  
Certainly many within the analytic tradition have assumed so.  John Perry, for instance, says that 
the first tenet of the “doctrine of propositions” is that belief is a “relation between a subject and 
                                                
3 Dummett, 1994, pp. 26-7.  For more on this thesis, see Follesdal, 1969, and Smith and McIntyre, 1982, p. 183.  See 
also Husserl, Ideas I, sec. 124. 
4 Frege, 1906, p. 246.  Robert Hanna writes that “Frege’s extreme anti-psychologism so effectively banishes the 
mind from the theory of meaning and logic that it becomes virtually impossible to understand how logical 
propositions can ever actually take on direct relations to logical thinkers.” (Hanna, 1993, p. 253.  See also Willard, 
1994) 
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an object,” and that the sorts of objects in question are propositions. (Perry, 1979, p. 6)  And it 
might be thought that such an account is required if we are to uphold the objectivity of contents.  
For acts of thinking, after all, are not shareable; you cannot have my belief.  Whatever is 
objective must, it seems, be placed on the object side of the act-object intentional nexus.  Russell 
seems to have come to such a conclusion on the basis of this thoroughly Fregean-sounding 
argument: 
One man’s act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man’s; one man’s act of 
thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man’s act of thought at another 
time.  Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could 
think of it, and no one man could think of it twice.  That which many different thoughts of 
whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. (Russell, 
1999, p. 71) 
But there is another feature that distinct thoughts of whiteness have in common besides 
whiteness: the property of being of or about whiteness.  But this property is not itself whiteness, 
since the things that have it need not be white, and the things which have the property of 
whiteness need not be of or about anything at all.  If there were no such property, there would be 
no thoughts of whiteness, and if it were not a shareable, and to that extent objective, property, 
then only one thought could ever succeed in being of whiteness.  
With respect to Frege’s view, the same point holds: the acts wherein senses are “grasped” 
must have something objective in common in addition to their senses, namely the property of 
grasping those senses.  My grasping of a sense S has a property in common with yours, namely, 
that of being of S.  Frege is, to be sure, right to insist that “It is so much of the essence of each of 
my ideas to be the content of my consciousness, that every idea of another person is, just as such, 
distinct from mine.” (Frege, 1918, p. 525)  But could this possibly be false of individual 
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graspings of thoughts and senses?  Of course every particular “idea” is numerically distinct from 
every other; like my fingers or my bank account, each of my ideas is mine.  But, just like my 
fingers and my bank account, my ideas instantiate properties that are common to many things 
that are not mine.         
Husserl, who clearly realizes this, dispenses with “graspings” and locates senses, 
concepts and propositions “in” the mind, not as parts or constituents, nor as objects, but as 
properties.  A particular act of meaning something is related to its objective content in the same 
way that a particular instance of redness is related to the shareable property of redness:                 
The manifold singulars for the ideal unity Meaning are naturally the corresponding act-moments 
of meaning, the meaning-intentions.  Meaning is related to varied acts of meaning… just as 
Redness in specie is to the slips of paper which lie here, and which all ‘have’ the same redness.  
(LI II, 32, p. 330)   
On Husserl’s view, contents are intentional properties, properties which determine or partially 
determine the specific intentionality of an act, and which bestow on an act various properties of 
the content itself, including its truth value, if it has one.     
 According to Husserl’s account in the Logical Investigations, every intentional 
experience consists of two inseparable but independently variable part-moments, a matter and a 
quality.  Husserl defines the matter as “that element in an act which first gives it reference to an 
object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general 
way, but also the precise way in which it is meant.” (LI V, sec. 20, p. 589)  The Ideal property 
instantiated in the matter of an act is a sense or proposition.  Another feature shared by all 
intentional experiences or mental acts is a quality – a mental analogue of Frege’s assertoric force 
– which Husserl defines as “the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely 
presentative, judgemental, emotional, desiderative, etc.” (LI V, sec. 20, p. 586)  The union of the 
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matter and the quality of an act Husserl calls its “intentional” or “semantic essence.”  Meanings – 
the sorts of contents that are expressed in assertions, questions, commands, wishes, and so forth 
– are “ideational abstractions” of an act’s semantic essence. (LI V, sec. 21, p. 590)  And all of 
these properties, like many other mental and non-mental properties, are susceptible to a priori 
investigation. 
It should be clear that Husserl’s account is perfectly consistent with his and Frege’s 
insistence that contents are objective in all of the senses discussed earlier.  That contents are 
instantiated in particular mental acts does not exclude their being shareable, ontologically 
independent of our psychological constitutions or any particular mental acts whose contents they 
are, and ideal or non-actual.  Fodor, who may or may not be aware of the similarities between his 
and Husserl’s account, expresses this point with characteristic clarity: 
…[T]o claim that MOPs [modes of presentation or senses] must be mental objects is quite 
compatible with also claiming that they are abstract objects, and that abstract objects are not 
mental.  The apparent tension is reconciled by taking MOPS-qua-things-in-the-head to be the 
tokens of which MOPS-qua-abstract-objects are the types. (Fodor, 1998, p. 20) 
Holding such a view does not, moreover, commit one to logical psychologism.  It in no way 
follows from Husserl’s (or Fodor’s) position that psychological states are either the truth-makers 
of logical propositions, or the evidential basis of our knowledge of them. Just as the fact that the 
instances of geometrical types are physical entities does not entail that geometry is a branch of 
physics, so the fact that the instances of contents are psychological entities does not entail that 
logic is a branch of psychology.5     
 The extrusion of thoughts, in the sense of ideal, repeatable contents, from the individual 
minds in which they just so happen to be instantiated is, on Husserl’s view, really just a special 
                                                
5 This by now is a familiar point.  See, for instance, Willard, 1994, Smith, “Logic and Formal Ontology,” 1989, 
Martin, 1999. 
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case of extruding what is ideal from what is real, an extrusion that he regards as mandatory in 
any domain of existence whatsoever.  Granted that such a distinction exists, no linguistic turn is 
necessary.  Rather, a philosophy of thought can, as it seems it ought, proceed by consulting 
(among other things) the actual processes of thinking, meaning, knowing, and so forth, not qua 
contingent empirical episodes but qua ideal, repeatable types or “essences.”  Such an approach, 
however, surely counts as mythological by Dummett’s lights, and so locating contents, meanings 
and so forth in “language” might seem mandatory.   
This, however, brings us to the second point on which Dummett is mistaken, and that is 
in supposing that making the linguistic turn, and thus preserving the objectivity of thoughts, is 
sufficient to avoid the pitfalls of psychologism.  There is a powerful argument against 
Dummett’s position which, strangely enough, is not mentioned by those who have expressly 
addressed Dummett’s arguments against Husserl, and it is that this position is subject to most, if 
not all, of the arguments Husserl leveled against psychologism.  What Husserl finds 
fundamentally objectionable about psychologism is not it grounds logic in psychology or renders 
it or its subject matter “subjective” or “private,” but that it grounds logic on an empirical basis.   
Logical laws are “as little psychological as they are empirical,” (LI Prolegomena, 23, 105) and 
the whole case for psychologism rests upon an empiricistic obliviousness to the “distinction 
between ideal and real objects, and the corresponding distinction between ideal and real laws.” 
(LI Prolegomena 24, p. 110.  See also sections 48 and 51.)   This is why Husserl’s extends his 
critique of psychologism to the biologism of Mach and Avenarius, (LI, Prolegomena, secs. 52-
56) and to empiricism as such.  So, any position according to which logical entities and the laws 
pertaining to them are ontologically dependent upon actually existing languages or its speakers, 
or which entails that our knowledge of them is epistemically grounded in knowledge of empirical 
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facts about languages, the conventions of linguistic communities, or the antics of their individual 
members, is in the same boat as psychologism, however “objective” such entities might be.  For 
such a position entails that the laws of logic are merely contingent, and that our knowledge of 
them is a posteriori, both of which are false.6  Just as logical laws do not explicitly or implicitly 
say anything whatsoever about consciousness or conscious beings, neither do they explicitly or 
implicitly say anything about actual languages or speakers.7  Just as logical laws cannot be 
verified or refuted on the basis of empirical propositions asserting the real existence of minds, so 
they cannot be verified or refuted on the basis of empirical propositions asserting the real 
existence of languages and speakers.8  Just as the truth of logical laws is, in virtue of being 
necessary, independent of the existence and empirical character of our minds, so it is 
independent of the existence and empirical features of our languages.     
One might respond that a theory of meaning or thought is not grounded in empirical facts 
about languages, but in the essence or “concept” of language as such.  Surely a great deal of 
linguistic philosophy, not excepting Dummett’s own, proceeds as if this is so, brimming, as it 
does, with blatantly non-empirical (and non-analytic) claims about meaning, truth, reference, and 
so forth, whose truth-makers and justifiers surely don’t seem to be the waggings of this or that 
tongue.  But if it is legitimate to investigate language in an a priori fashion, then it’s not exactly 
obvious why it is illegitimate to investigate consciousness itself in such fashion—to ask what the 
essences of thinking, perceiving, knowing, and so forth are, and to derive ideal, necessary laws 
                                                
6 See Willard, 1984, p. 161: “This I take to be the strongest point in Husserl’s argument against psychologism as he 
understood it.  If the laws of logic were psychological laws, then the evidence which we have for them would have 
to be based upon a careful analysis of cognitive experiences and justified by its result.”  And if the laws of logic 
were somehow dependent upon empirical facts about language, then our knowledge of them would have to be based 
upon a careful description of those facts.  
7 LI Prolegomena, sec. 23.  See also sec. 28, p. 125: “The truth that the members of such a [contradictory] pair of 
propositions are not both true, contains no shadow of an empirical assertion about any consciousness and its acts of 
judgment.” 
8 LI Prolegomena, sec. 37, pp. 144-5: “…any theory is logically absurd which deduces logical principles from any 
matters of fact.”  
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from such investigations.  And this is exactly what the vast bulk of philosophical investigations 
of perception, knowledge, and so forth have aspired to do, both within and without the Analytic 
tradition.      
What these considerations show is that making the linguistic turn is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to avoid psychologism, or at least a position similarly flawed.  It is not necessary since 
various properties instantiated in conscious states can be studied non-empirically, that is, by 
means other than empirical psychology.  Nor is it sufficient, since any attempt to ground the laws 
of logic, or our knowledge thereof, in facts about language, provided that by “language” one 
means something that has a comfortable place within an empiricist epistemology and a broadly 
naturalistic metaphysics, is subject to virtually all of the criticisms that Husserl directed at logical 
psychologism.    
Still, nothing thus far said establishes that the linguistic analysis of thought, properly 
executed, is not the most effective way to develop a comprehensive theory of thought.  To 
endorse the linguistic turn, it is sufficient to recognize “that thought, by its nature, cannot occur 
without a vehicle, and that language is the vehicle whose operation is the most perspicuous and 
hence the most amenable to a systematic philosophical account.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 171)  Nor 
does anything said thus far cast any doubt on the Communicability Thesis.  So let us turn, first, 
to Wayne Martin’s argument against Dummett’s position, and then to another that is, I think, 
more powerful.   
 
II. 
The most obvious place to look for linguistically inexpressible content is in acts of perception, 
and that is exactly where Wayne Martin alleges to have discovered it.  Martin argues that “the 
 13 
noematic content of experience” both (i) contributes to the “objective content” of the experience 
and (ii) makes a contribution that no “linguistic expression of that content” could.9 (Martin, 
1999, pp. 358-9)  His example involves the noematic structures involved in seeing Mt. Shasta as 
one approaches it by automobile.  The noematic structures of the experience do all of the 
following: (a) provide a local sense of direction and movement, and by those means gives one a 
sense of (b) the objective distance of the mountain, which together with one’s own speed, 
provides (c) information regarding the objective size of the mountain.  (Martin, 1999, pp. 357-8)  
These features of the noematic content make a distinctive contribution to the objective content of 
the experience because “it is part of the structure in virtue of which my experience amounts to 
experience of an enduring object.” (Martin, 1999, p. 359)  And they are inexpressible 
linguistically.  “Certainly no analysis of the meaning of English or German would suffice.  We 
can no more establish our sense of direction on the basis of semantic analysis than we can 
establish the shortest distance axiom on an analysis of the terms ‘shortest’ and ‘straight’.” 
(Martin, 1999, p. 359) 
 Dummett is the first to admit that “…perception is that mental act least obviously fitted to 
be expressed in words.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 27)  And far from pursuing the route of John 
McDowell or Bill Brewer by asserting that the content of perception is exclusively 
“conceptual”—a position for which Martin’s example spells obvious trouble—Dummett 
criticizes both Frege and Husserl for assimilating perceptual consciousness too closely to 
                                                
9 I have refrained from discussing Husserl’s position in terms of noemata and their contents because, while I think I 
know what noemata aren’t, I have no clear idea what they are or exactly what they are supposed to do in addition to 
the noetic aspects of an act.  Martin’s argument, however, does not rely on any contentious theses about noemata; it 
is enough, for the purposes of his argument, if experiential acts have noetic contents or structures (such as matters 
and qualities) that contribute to the objective content of the thought and are linguistically inexpressible – as they 
must, in any case, if noematic contents have these features as well.  Indeed, given the oft-alleged parallelism 
between noeses and noemata, I feel entirely comfortable side-stepping the entire multi-sided debate over the nature 
of noemata – thereby, I suppose, showing my true stripes as a noematic eliminativist.     
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thought.10  According to Dummett, perceptual experiences, including even the sorts of cognitive 
skills involved in determining local direction and recognizing typicalities, do not belong on the 
level of full-fledged thought, but to “proto-thought.”  Dummett is ready to admit that, to use his 
own example, a driver who must rapidly adjust his speed and direction is engaged in “highly 
concentrated thought,” but also that “the vehicle of such thoughts is certainly not language.”  
(Dummett, 1994, p. 122)  Instead, however, of treating this as evidence against his view, 
Dummett instead draws the conclusion that such “thoughts” are merely proto-thoughts, which 
are distinguished from full-fledged thoughts by their “incapacity for detachment from present 
activities and circumstances.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 123)  Such proto-thoughts are likely to be 
confused with full-fledged thoughts because we “slide so readily” from one to the other, but we 
must nevertheless distinguish them if we are to make sense of the ability of drivers, children, and 
non-linguistic animals to navigate their environments successfully.    
 In light of the distinction between proto-thought and full-fledged thought, Dummett can 
respond to Martin’s second point as follows: yes, the acts in virtue of which someone driving 
towards Mt. Shasta acquires a local sense of direction, a sense of the mountain’s distance and 
size, do not have language as their vehicles.  But this doesn’t entail that thoughts (or thought 
contents) are not all linguistically expressible, since those acts don’t take place at the level of 
thought.  With respect to the first point—that such contents are objective in the sense that they 
are partially constitutive of the experience being of an enduring object—Dummett can respond 
that it is no part of his theory that proto-thoughts must lack objective content, that is, 
directedness upon objective, enduring objects.  The distinction between proto-thought and full-
fledged thought is not that the latter possesses, while the former lacks, objective content, but that 
                                                
10 “Both Frege and Husserl surely went too far in assimilating the ‘interpretation’ whose informing our sensations 
constitutes our sense-perceptions to the thoughts that we express in language.” (Dummett, 1993, p.  121) 
 15 
the former is a sort of content that is utterly dependent on present activities and circumstances.11  
Nor is Dummett committed to rejecting the view that episodes of thought might depend, for their 
existence and/or their specific intentional bearing, on occurrences at the level of proto-thought.   
This response is not without difficulties, however.  The first is that the foregoing 
considerations concerning the division between thought and something like but less than thought 
might not only cast doubt on Martin’s argument against Dummett, they might cast doubt on 
Dummett’s argument against Husserl as well.  Charles Parsons raises the question whether 
Dummett is right in contending that Husserl’s generalization of something like sense beyond its 
application to linguistically expressible acts precludes him from making the linguistic turn, since 
such an extension “is most in evidence when it is applied in domains whose relation to a domain 
of thought is not simple or straightforward,” such as perception and imagination. (Parsons, 2000, 
p. 130) To claim that the features of such acts in virtue of which they are perceptual or 
imaginative are linguistically inexpressible would not rule out the linguistic turn, but might pave 
the way for it, for such features are what distinguishes thought from perception and imagination.  
(Parsons, 2000, p. 132)  That is, that perceptual acts have a sense might be compatible with the 
linguistic turn, provided that the features in virtue of which it is perceptual do not themselves lie 
at the level of sense.  And so we, in turn, might respond to Dummett that Husserl’s account of 
intentionality does not rule out the linguistic turn, at least not for the reason that he supposes, 
because although perceptual and other intuitive acts do have a sense, their sense is not what 
distinguishes them from non-intuitive or signitive acts.  
To this argument Dummett has, I think, a ready response, and that is that Husserl himself 
very explicitly holds, in his writings some time after the Investigations, that the linguistically 
inexpressible components of a noema possess something very much like a sense.  That is, 
                                                
11 For an account of nonconceptual content along these lines, see Kelly, 2001.  
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Husserl seems committed to a view according to which there are contents of mental acts that are 
both (a) very much like senses but (b) do not have language as their vehicle.12  But that is not the 
position Dummett endorses; proto-thoughts, for him, are not full-fledged thoughts without 
linguistic clothing, nor are they almost like full-fledged thoughts, as they seem to be for Husserl. 
Rather, proto-thoughts differ from full-fledged thoughts in kind; they are not two species of a 
common genus.  Of course, Dummett surely owes us an explanation why, if this is so, we slide 
so readily from one to the other.  But at least it’s not obvious that the envisaged Dummettian 
response to Martin’s argument undermines Dummett’s own argument against Husserl.  
The second worry is that the envisaged Dummettian response to Martin’s argument might 
seem entirely to beg the question against Martin, for it might appear that Dummett’s principal 
reason for distinguishing thought from proto-thought is on the basis of linguistic expressibility 
itself.  But what is in question is precisely whether or not all thoughts are linguistically 
expressible, and so appealing to linguistic expressibility as a criterion for thoughthood begs the 
question at hand.  And yet Dummett is drawing, in his own fashion, a distinction that 
philosophers have drawn since Plato distinguished between aisthesis and noesis, a distinction 
between intuition and understanding or conception, and the contention that language is, or at 
least can be, the vehicle of conceptual thinking is one that is independently plausible.  For what 
distinguishes conceptual content is that it can serve as the content of acts that differ from one 
another in their specific intuitive content.  Husserl writes of the matter of an act, wherein its 
sense lies: “However the fullness of a presentation may vary within its possible gradients of 
fulfilment, its intentional object, intended as it is intended, remains the same: its ‘matter’, in 
                                                
12 See Ideas I, sec. 124, p. 294: “But one can scarcely avoid… extending the signification of these words 
[‘signifying’ and ‘signification’] and suitably modifying them so that they can find application of a certain kind to 
the whole noetic-noematic sphere: thus application to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not.” 
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other words, stays the same.”13  And that is exactly what characterizes linguistically expressible 
content as well. It is a constitutive principle of linguistic competence that someone who can 
understand an utterance of, say, ‘snow is white’ can do so whether or not any snow, or anything 
white, is intuitively present.  Even sentences involving certain demonstratives (with the possible 
exception of ‘I’) have this character: I can know exactly what an utterance of ‘that table is 
brown’ means without seeing the table in just this way, or even presently seeing it at all, as when 
I turn my back to it and utter that sentence while pointing over my shoulder.  Though perhaps 
such contents are not entirely detachable from present circumstances and activities, they are at 
least detachable from the specific intuitive or perceptual contents that often accompany them.  
This perhaps explains why Husserl endorses what Smith and McIntyre call the “expressibility 
thesis,” namely that the “noematic Sinn” or matter of any act can be linguistically expressed.   
(See Ideas I, sec. 124, p. 295 and Smith and McIntyre, 1982, pp. 182-4)   
Whatever one makes of Dummett’s distinction between thought and proto-thought, it is at 
least obvious that what distinguishes thought from perception, and perceptual acts among 
themselves, does not, in all cases, lie at the level of sense.  Dummett, unfortunately and surely in 
opposition to his considered view, himself sometimes implies that there is a distinct sense 
corresponding to each way in which an object is given: “If someone knows what the referent of 
an expression is, then this referent must be given to him in some particular way, and the way in 
which it is given constitutes the sense which he attaches to the expression.”  (Dummett, 1993, p. 
23)  But this is surely false.  You don’t need to see the referent of the expression ‘the green 
                                                
13 Husserl puts forward the same position in Ideas I: acts in which the “full noema” differs can nevertheless have 
identical “noematic cores.”  See, for instance, secs. 91 and 136.   The idea that conceptual contents are detachable 
from present circumstances and/or experiences is also something to which McDowell seems committed: “We can 
ensure that what we have in view is genuinely recognizable as a conceptual capacity if we insist that the very same 
capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of the experience itself.”  
(McDowell, 1994, p. 57)  
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house’ from just this point of view, in just this way, to know what its referent is.  If you did, then 
the sense would not be what we each grasp when we understand the sentence “the green house is 
large,” since, when we each understand that sentence simultaneously, it will never be the case 
that the house is given in the same way.14  This is why Husserl insists that although an object or 
person may—or rather must—appear differently in different perceptual circumstances, “Each 
appearance from such an intuitive manifold will justify a precisely synonymous use of the proper 
name.” (LI VI, 7, 693)  The same point holds for demonstratives.    The relative autonomy from 
intuition is precisely what characterizes the sphere of sense, the “conceptual sphere,” as 
Dummett himself seems to acknowledge in his distinction between thought and proto-thought.   
If senses, thus construed, are the sole components of thoughts with which a philosophy of 
thought must concern itself, then a philosophy of thought need not concern itself with those 
features of mental acts in virtue of which they are perceptual or, more broadly, intuitive.  And so 
Dummett might respond to Martin that the features of acts that are admittedly inexpressible, or at 
least inexpressible in the same way senses are, do not really belong to the level of thought 
because they do not belong at the level of sense.  Whatever way in which one can represent Mt. 
Shasta as being can be expressed in the form of a statement, even if the particular ways in which 
it is represented as being that way cannot.   
If this response is right, then perhaps the Husserlian theory of intentionality presented in 
the Logical Investigations, prior to his generalizing the notion of sense beyond what can be 
expressed, is compatible with the linguistic turn.  But it’s not.  One reason is that, although 
Husserl there agrees with Dummett in locating sense at the level of (expressible) thought, he 
                                                
14 “We must, in describing the fine-grained phenomenology, make use of the notion of the way in which some 
property or relation is given in the experience.  The same shape can be perceived in two different ways, and the 
same holds for the shape properties, if we regard them as within the representational content of the experience.”  
(Peacocke, 2001, p. 240)  Not only can the same shape be perceived in two different ways, but it can be represented 
as being the same shape in both acts.  See also Kelly, 2001.  
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does not agree that a comprehensive philosophy of thought must or can confine itself to the level 
of sense.  And neither, for that matter, would Martin.  For even Martin is prepared to admit that 
the noematic features of experiential states that defy linguistic expression do not reside at the 
level of sense.15  And yet they are essential for the act to bear upon just the object that it does.  
This is something that Husserl himself insists upon when he characterizes perception as an act 
which, though it does not carry or confer meaning, is a necessary condition for certain meanings, 
namely demonstratives, to have a determinate reference.  (See LI VI, secs. 4-5)  As most would 
agree, you don’t know what thought I am expressing when I say ‘that bird is black’ unless you 
know which bird I am referring to, and this involves either present or recent perceptual 
acquaintance with the bird.    “Thus,” writes Barry Smith, “[Husserl] allows that the linguistic act 
that is here incomplete as far as meaning is concerned may come to be saturated or made 
complete by acts of other sorts, in this case by acts of perception.”  (Smith, 1989b, p. 170)  And 
so, provided a comprehensive theory of thought must concern itself with those mental acts upon 
which acts of thought constitutively depend, a theory of thought must concern itself with acts 
that, by Dummett’s lights, lie within the sphere of proto-thought.  The dispute between Dummett 
and Martin, therefore, centers around the issues of (a) whether full-fledged thought constitutively 
depends on proto-thought, and, perhaps more importantly, (b) whether, if it does, a 
comprehensive account of full-fledged thought must concern itself with proto-thought as well.           
 
III. 
Now that may well constitute part of the debate between Dummett and Husserl as well.  But it is 
definitely not the decisive one.  Husserl, as early as his account in the Logical Investigations and 
                                                
15 “The fact that there is extra-conceptual structure in my experience, and that this structure makes a distinctive 
contribution to the determination of objective reference, shows that senses do not do all the work in determining the 
intentional content of my experience.” (Martin, 1999, p. 359) 
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thus prior to his generalization of the idea of sense to the inexpressible components of acts, holds 
a position incompatible with the Communicability Thesis.  And Martin’s position is not 
obviously incompatible with that thesis, since CT maintains only that all contents of thoughts are 
communicable.  What makes Husserl’s position incompatible with CT is that he holds that there 
are contents of full-fledged thoughts, and full-fledged thoughts that amount to knowledge, that 
cannot be linguistically expressed. 
Husserl does, to be sure, draw a very intimate connection between thought and language.  
“All thought,” he writes, “and in particular all theoretical thought and knowledge, is carried on 
by way of certain ‘acts’, which occur in a context of expressive discourse.” (LI VI, Introduction, 
p. 667) And yet there are certain cases of thinking and knowing which are such that not all of 
their contents are capable of linguistic expression.  Otherwise put, the expressible contents of an 
act are those moments making up its intentional essence, but the intentional essence does not 
comprise the full intentional content of the act.  To see this, note that mental acts with the same 
expressible content—the same matter and quality—can vary in phenomenologically obvious and 
epistemically relevant ways.  I can think that my table is brown, and can produce and understand 
precisely synonymous utterances and inscriptions of sentences that express that thought, whether 
or not my table is perceptually present to me or not.  In the latter case, my thought is “empty” or 
“signitive.”  In the former case it is intuitively fulfilled: the table is not only meant, but is present 
to me as I mean it to be, and I am conscious of its being as I mean it.  Acts of this sort are cases 
of fulfillment.  In the ideal case of fulfillment—it permits of more and less, insofar as something 
might be presented more or less as one means it—I “experience how the same objective item 
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which was ‘merely thought of’ in symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as 
being precisely the determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or meant to be.”16 
Despite assurances to the contrary by certain philosophers, finding the world to be as one 
thinks it to be is among the most commonplace of experiences.  And yet it is not a simple one.  
Rather, it involves at least two mental acts.  The first is the “mere thought” that something is the 
case.  The second is an intuition of the very thing that was merely thought of.  For this reason, 
Husserl characterizes fulfillment as an act of identification, in which the two constituent acts 
achieve a “unity of identity.”17 (LI VI, sec. 8, p. 696)  This structure is most evident in the 
dynamic case of fulfillment, in which something that is merely thought of at one time is later 
intuitively presented as it was thought to be, but Husserl insists that even in the static case the 
same structure is in place.  It is, however, “a seamless unity, which only acquires articulation 
when drawn out in time.”  (LI VI, sec. 9, p. 698) 
Although Husserl does not always successfully distinguish between perception and 
fulfillment, acts of fulfillment are substantially more complex than mere acts of perceiving, 
because they involve not only apprehending an object or state of affairs perceptually, but 
thoughtfully as well.  In order to have one’s thought that p fulfilled on an intuitive basis, one 
must actually think that p.  There are many cases in which perception can occur without 
fulfillment.  For instance, I might thumb through a deck of cards in pursuit of the queen of 
                                                
16 LI 6, 8, 694.  See also LI VI, 16, 720:  “What the intention means, but presents only in more or less inauthentic 
and inadequate manner, the fulfillment – the act attaching itself to an intention, and offering it ‘fullness’ in the 
synthesis of fulfillment – sets directly before us, or at least more directly than the intention does.  In fulfillment our 
experience is represented by the words: ‘This is the thing itself’.”   
17 Husserl seems, in some of his later works, to abandon the view that fulfillment involves two acts.  Certainly he 
abandons the view that perception does.  What’s just not clear at any point in Husserl’s writings is whether and to 
what degree he distinguishes fulfillment and perception.  For more on this, see Hopp (forthcoming).  In any case, 
such a distinction must be made, for the reasons given in the text: neither perception, nor even perception plus 
thought, invariably amount to fulfillment.  Not only can one think about things about things without intuiting 
them—a possibility that Husserl frankly acknowledges—but one can also intuit things without thinking about them.  
And one can do both without the relevant synthesis taking place.       
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spades and perceive fifty-two cards, yet not have the thought that there are fifty-two cards 
fulfilled because I had no such thought.  My seeing of the cards is, as Dretske would say, “non-
epistemic.”  And I may, in checking whether a deck is complete and fulfilling my thought that 
there are fifty-two cards, perceive the queen of spades, without having any thoughts about it 
fulfilled.  Moreover, creatures with conceptual deficiencies cannot experience certain sorts of 
fulfillment, not for lack of the appropriate sensory organs, but for want of the ability to carry out 
the relevant thoughts.  A monkey can perceive a computer, but cannot, given some plausible 
assumptions about the conceptual sophistication of monkeys, have the thought that something is 
a computer fulfilled.  Finally, the acts must enter into the appropriate relationship with one 
another, a “synthesis of identity.”  It is possible both to perceive an object and to have a thought 
about it without, however, having one’s thought fulfilled by the perception.  One might, for 
instance, wonder where one’s keys or glasses are despite the fact that one is looking right at 
them.      
Acts of fulfillment possess a further property, and that is that they lead one closer to the 
goal of, and in many cases constitute, knowledge, and do so in virtue of their intuitive content, 
which presents the intended object itself.  Holding all of my other beliefs constant, I am in a 
better situation epistemically if my belief that my table is brown is fulfilled on an intuitive basis 
than I am if I merely believe that it is emptily.  Indeed, while not all acts of knowing are 
fulfillments—if they were, most scientific knowledge would be impossible—fulfillment is 
exactly what knowledge at its best is.  Of all the individual reasons one can have for believing 
that something is thus and so, finding it to be as one thinks it to be—thus and so—is typically the 
best.      
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In light of this, we can now ask: is it, after all, the essence of thought to be communicable 
without residue by means of language?  Obviously this hangs on just what it means for a content 
to be expressible or communicable.  Now in one sense, as Dummett insists, everything, including 
thoughts, knowledge, and “every other type of awareness,” is communicable in language.  “It is 
senseless to assert that there is something of which we cannot speak: for if we cannot speak of it, 
our attempt to speak of it must necessarily be frustrated.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 141)  The present 
discussion ensures that any attempt, on my part, to claim that intuitive contents cannot be objects 
of discourse will be self-defeating.   
This, however, is not the only, or even the most fruitful, concept of communicability or 
expressibility available, as Dummett himself well knows.  All “ideas” or subjective occurrences 
are communicable, for Dummett, but not in the same way that thoughts are.  (Dummett, 1994, p. 
141)  And it’s easy to see that the sense in which an object of discourse, whether an idea or a 
public object, is communicated or expressed is radically different than the sense in which a 
thought-content or sense is expressed.  The expressed propositional content of a sentence is 
typically not to found among the objects that that sentence is about.  In the sentence “Grass is 
green,” the concepts of grass and of green are expressed, but they are not objects of discourse.  
That sentence is not used to predicate greenness of a sense or concept, nor to predicate a sense or 
concept (in the more widespread, non-Fregean sense of the term ‘concept’) to grass.   (The 
difference between the concept and the property of green is readily apparent when we realize that 
what it is to possess one is not what it is to possess the other.)  And although everything of which 
we can speak can be expressed in the sense of being spoken of, not everything can be expressed 
in the sense in which the concept of green is expressed in the sentence above.  Such things as 
trees and colors and my left knee might be constituents of states of affairs or truth-makers, and so 
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objects of discourse, but they are not the right kinds of things to serve as constituents of truth-
bearers or thoughts.  And they are never linguistically expressed in the same way that concepts 
or senses are.  They do not mean anything, are not about anything, in the way that senses and 
propositions do and are.   
Just what is it for something to be communicable or expressible by means of language in 
this sense?  It’s difficult to say exactly, but perhaps it is best to see what, minimally, must 
happen when someone succeeds in communicating something to someone else by means of 
language.  Language can be used to do a number of things.  But without doubt one of the 
fundamental purposes of linguistic communication is to cause someone to think thoughts.  Very 
often one voluntarily acquaints oneself with linguistic signs for the sole purpose of being caused 
to think certain thoughts; I have in mind such activities as opening up a book or attending a talk.  
When one speaker or writer succeeds in communicating something, in this sense, to someone 
else, what must happen is that the latter winds up being in a mental state with the same, or 
partially the same, content as that of the former.  In Fregean terms, when I understand a sentence, 
I “grasp” the thought that it expresses.  And we know what such “grasping” amounts to on 
Husserl’s view: being in a mental state whose matter instantiates the sense or meaning expressed 
in the sentence.  If you tell me that your house is white, I thereby, provided I am paying attention 
to you, come to be in a mental state whose matter-content is that your house is white.  Roughly, 
then, a content C is communicable by means of a sentence S of L iff a competent speaker of L 
would be in a mental state with C as its content upon understanding an utterance or inscription of 
S.18       
                                                
18 “If we succeed in communicating with our hearer, we will convey to him a meaning whereby he will come to 
intend theis same object.  Indeed, he will intend it through the same noematic Sinn we do…” (Smith and McIntyre, 
1982, p. 180) 
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Intuitive contents are not linguistically communicable in this sense.  If I understand an 
utterance of yours, I do not thereby come to be in a mental state with the same intuitive content 
as yours; there are no particular intuitive contents that are necessary for me to understand an 
utterance of yours, except those intuitive contents which acquaint me with your tokening of a 
sentence itself.  Because no particular intuitive contents are necessary for me to be in a mental 
state with the same matter-contents as yours, no matter-contents are sufficient for me to be in a 
mental state with the same intuitive contents as yours.  There is, at least in the case of non-
performative utterances, nothing that you can communicate to me in words that is sufficient for 
me to be in a mental state with the same intuitive content as your own.  And insofar as intuitive 
contents are necessary components of acts of fulfillment, there is nothing that you can 
communicate to me in words that is sufficient for me to have the communicated thought fulfilled 
on an intuitive basis.  If you tell me your house is white, or that you perceive that your house is 
white, or even describe to me in vivid detail how the house appears to you from your present 
vantage point, I am no closer to being in a mental state whose intuitive contents fulfill the 
thought that your house is white; I am no closer to finding the house to be as I think it to be.  In 
short, no amount of talking on your part—except the sort of talking that induces me to situate 
myself in eyeshot of your house, such as threats or bribes—can put me in a mental state in which 
the house is given to me as I think it to be.       
 The thesis, then, that all contents of thoughts can be communicated without residue by 
linguistic means is false.  Telling someone that a is F is not sufficient to provide someone with a 
fulfilling intuition that a is F.  And insofar as having or lacking such a fulfilling intuition 
sometimes spells the difference between knowing and not knowing, and virtually always 
accounts for some difference in the epistemic status of the respective thoughts, that, I think, is a 
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fairly significant “residue” left untouched by language.  And since the truth of the 
Communicability Thesis is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of the sort of linguistic 
analysis of thought envisioned by Dummett and countless others, making such a linguistic turn 
cannot provide a comprehensive theory of thought and knowledge.      
 It might be objected that the intuitive contents in question belong to the level of proto-
thought.  Perhaps so, when those contents are constituents of mere perception, and perform no 
fulfilling function.  But in the unity of fulfillment, such perceptual acts become one with an act 
of meaning, an act at the level of thought itself.  Such acts, that is, aren’t merely acts upon which 
acts of thought constitutively depend, but acts which, when united in the right way with acts of 
thought, are themselves constituents of acts of thought and knowledge.  And one can see that an 
act of fulfillment is a genuine whole, rather than a mere sum, when one realizes that it often has 
properties that its constituent acts and heaps composed of them lack, such as a positive epistemic 
status.  An act of mere perception is never an act of knowing, and a merely empty thought might 
have any epistemic status whatsoever.  But an act of perceptual fulfillment of any appreciable 
degree has a positive epistemic status.  In fulfillment, an object is not just given to the brain, or to 
an “informational system,” or even to consciousness, but to thought.  And talking to someone 
just is not sufficient to make him possess knowledge, or at least knowledge of the same kind and 
degree as that which occurs in fulfillment.  So it is also false that “any knowledge we have must 
be communicable.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 140)  While the conceptual or propositional content of 
knowledge is communicable, in the sense that by talking to someone I can, if he understands me, 
place him in a mental state with the same propositional content as my own, knowledge itself 
need not be.  A person does not, in all cases, come to know that p just because I successfully 
communicate that p to him, even if my act of thinking that p is or has been fulfilled.  And even if 
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he does, as may happen, his knowledge does not rest upon an acquaintance with the state of 
affairs designated by the proposition that p, but, in part, on his confidence in my veracity.  Your 
knowledge, if you can be said to have it, that my office is a mess does not have the same 
epistemic status as mine, since you are obliged to take my word for it, while I get to consult my 
office itself.  And that undoubtedly places me in a stronger epistemic position with respect to this 
content than you.     
So if part of the task of a philosophy of thought consists in spelling out the nature of 
knowledge, or distinguishing good from bad thinking, it must, if Husserl is right, incorporate an 
account of fulfillment, and so must incorporate into its account those linguistically inexpressible 
contents that do the fulfilling.  And it seems obvious to me that a comprehensive theory of 
thought must have something to say about knowledge.  And this is Husserl’s view as well.  
Indeed, Husserl’s view is that fulfillment is the goal towards which all unfulfilled, signitive 
thinking is teleologically oriented, and that, as such, one simply cannot grasp what intentionality 
in general, or any positing intentional act in particular, is without grasping what happens or 
would happen when it succeeds in reaching its goal.  That goal is truth, of course, but more 
importantly, the consciousness of truth—the consciousness of the correspondence between our 
thoughts about things and the things those thoughts are about—that occurs in acts of fulfillment.  
Meanings are authentically grasped, not by grasping their truth conditions alone, but by grasping 
how, if at all, those truth conditions (or their contradictories) would present themselves to 
consciousness.  Thus Husserl writes, “The concept of any intentionality whatsoever… and the 
concept of evidence, that intentionality that is the giving of something-itself, are essentially 
correlative.” (Husserl, FTL, sec. 60, p. 160)  And yet, while knowledge of the fulfilling 
conditions of a thought is presupposed by thought itself, actual fulfillment is not, like a thought’s 
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sense, something for which language is a vehicle.  Rather, fulfillment is achieved by means of 
the intuitive content of the meaning-fulfilling act, something that, even on Dummett’s own terms, 
is not linguistically expressed or communicable in the same way senses or thoughts are.     
To wrap up, then, I have argued that (a) making the linguistic turn is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for avoiding psychologism, or a position with most of the same flaws as 
psychologism, and (b) there are certain contents, namely intuitive contents, which both cannot be 
linguistically expressed and belong, at least in those instances when they fulfill meaning-
intentions, to thoughts rather than or in addition to “proto-thoughts.”  These considerations, I 
think, go at least some way towards vindicating the direct inspection of conscious subjectivity as 
an indispensable method whereby to understand the nature of thought and how it bears upon the 
world.    
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